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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1912, Congress has outlawed foreign ownership or control of a
broadcast station.' This restriction is codified in its current form under the
Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act).2 By looking at the extensive
legislative history of these statutes, scholars have reached a consensus on
two main reasons why Congress passed the rule. The first of the two
reasons is based on national security. If a foreign-owned company were
granted a broadcast license, it could use the station to broadcast propaganda
or to jam American radio signals in times of war.3 Secondly, the foreign
ownership restriction can be viewed as a protectionist measure used to
promote American ownership of American media, and to prevent foreign
takeovers.4
There has been a growing movement in scholarship over the past
several decades to eliminate this ownership restriction. Some argue that
foreign ownership poses no threat to national security anymore, or that the
President can suspend the license under his war powers if such a threat
arises.5 Others argue that this restriction on trade hurts American interests
abroad on reciprocity grounds,6 as well as American interests at home by
limiting the market value of broadcast stations.7 On constitutional grounds,
some argue that the alien ownership restriction presents an unwarranted
limitation on speech.8
At the same time, mass media has been simultaneously expanding and
converging. Media companies have been discovering new markets and
merging old ones with increasing rapidity over the last few decades. For
example, the mobile phone ring tone market provided a huge boon to the
cellular and music industries in the early- to mid-2000s ($600 million in

1. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat. 302, 302 (1912) (regulating radio
communication).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 3 10(b) (2000).
3. Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring Foreigners From Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic
Potholeon the Global InformationHighway, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1188, 1195 (1995).

4. Id. at 1189.
5. See, e.g., John J. Watkins, Alien Ownership and the Communications Act, 33 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 6 (1981).
6. See, e.g., David H. Benz, Comment, The Little Network that Could- FCC
Restrictionson Foreign Ownership, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 239, 247 (1995).
7. Richard Cotton, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, NBC, Address at
the Foreign Ownership in the Communications Industries-An Analysis of Section 310
Symposium, reprintedin 4 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 10, 14 (1995).
8. Rose, supra note 3, at 1204-15.
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2006 alone), 9 and in the late 2000s, the introductions of so-called "smart
phones" (such as Apple's iPhone) merged existing telephone and computer
technologies into a single device.' 0 While this revolution has tremendous
potential, it has also created tremendous instability for the businesses
involved. Companies have discovered that the best way to survive this
instability is to fuse with other companies involved in different types of
media, thus forming large, vertically integrated conglomerates.
The alien ownership restriction has played a strong role in this
reshuffling of the media and entertainment industries. These conglomerates
require huge infusions of capital, especially upon formation. In today's
increasingly international economy, fewer and fewer companies are fully
owned or controlled by American citizens. This presents an obvious
problem for any entertainment conglomerate that has broadcast licensesin order to raise capital from foreign sources, the conglomerate must either
divest itself of any company with a broadcast license, or that company
could run the risk of losing the license, which could ruin its business.
Much has been written about the foreign ownership restriction in its
century of existence. There are excellent works arguing for the repeal of the
statute, and other equally excellent works arguing for a reinterpretation of
the statute for the sake of free trade. However, this Note approaches the
foreign ownership restriction from a business perspective, and so does not
argue for change, but rather explores the options available to a foreignowned media conglomerate that wishes to have a presence in the American
market. First, this Note will explain the necessity of the broadcast license
within the conglomerate's business plan. It will then outline the rules
governing foreign ownership and control. Finally, this Note will explore
possible business solutions to mitigate the effects of the foreign ownership
restriction.

II. CONGLOMERATION AND THE BROADCAST LICENSE
In order to understand the necessity of a broadcast license to the
modern entertainment conglomerate, it is important to first understand how
these conglomerates developed. The unification of smaller, independent,
and diverse companies into a larger whole began in the 1970s, but reached
its zenith at the turn of the twenty-first century." While some visionaries
took advantage of market synergies as early as the 1940s, the system as a

9. Brian Hiatt et al., The Record Industry's Slow Fade, ROLLING STONE, June 28,
2007, at 13.
10. See, e.g., Apple - iPhone, http://www.apple.com/iphone (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
11. Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 174 (2002).
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whole did not begin to capitalize on these synergies until the 1970s. 12 As
the following discussion will show, the broadcast license is one of the most
integral pieces of the puzzle.
A.

The Old Studio System
Everything starts with the movies, both chronologically and
financially. Ever since a small band of first-generation Americans moved
west from New York to escape the harassment of Thomas Edison and his
lawyers, Hollywood has been the entertainment capital of the United
States. 13
The first few decades were known as the Golden Age of Hollywood,
although the era was only gilded for some. Studios made extraordinary
profits in the fledgling industry. Studio heads were able to count on high
box office sales on the one hand, and extraordinarily low costs on the other.
Actors were usually signed to seven-year contracts, and risked being
blackballed if they broke their contract. 14 Writers were paid a weekly salary
and were expected to chum out scripts to keep up with the rapid pace of
production-up to six movies a month at some studios. 15 Rare was the
contract that contained any kind of profit participation, where an actor or
writer received additional sums based on the box office performance of the
movie. 16
Furthermore, the studios usually owned most of the theaters in which
their movies were shown. Even when the studio did not own the theater, it
still wielded tremendous power over the theater, often forcing the theater to
book films in blocks of ten.1 7 The studio would put one or two popular
movies in a block with many less successful movies, thus forcing the
theaters to either pay for everything or get nothing-i.e., no audience.
While the system did not work well for the exhibitors, it was lucrative for
the powerful studios.
High revenue and low costs kept the studios flush with profits all the
way through the 1940s. In 1947, the six major studios earned $1.1 billion
from their share of ticket sales, accounting for ninety-five percent of the
studios' overall revenue. 18 This made the movie industry America's third-

12. Merida Welles, Takovers Take Over Annual Meetings, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 1984, at
sec. 3, p. 4, availableat 1984 WLNR 533541 (Westlaw).
13. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE BIG PICTURE: MONEY AND POWER IN HOLLYWOOD 5

(2006).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
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largest retail business, behind grocery stores and the automotive industry.' 9
Furthermore, the studios' net receipts (revenue after distribution and
advertising costs) were $950 million.20
The Foundation Crumbles
Two separate forces combined to revolutionize the movie industry.
First, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began pressing an antitrust case
against the major studios. 2 ' This case was an attempt to bring down the
vertically integrated system where the content producers were also the
content distributors (by virtue of owning the theaters). Second, television
became an extremely popular form of entertainment. In just a few short
years, it cut dramatically into box office sales.

B.

1.

Antitrust

In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,22 the studios were
locked in a decade-long losing battle to maintain control over their system.
The five major studios (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 20th Century Fox, Warner
Bros., RKO, and Paramount) were engaged in two practices that awoke the
ire of the DOJ.
First, the studios operated as vertically integrated businesses. A single
company could undertake the production, distribution, and exhibition of a
motion picture, without any help from outside companies.2 3 While the
studios claimed that it was necessary to own the means of distribution and
exhibition in order to guarantee an outlet for the films they produced,2 4
independent exhibitors complained that the major studios used this
ownership for an unfair competitive advantage. When negotiating the
exhibition of a movie with smaller, independent theater chains, the studios
could threaten to show the movie only in studio-owned theaters, thus
shutting the independent chains out completely. 25 Since the independent
theaters had no substantial source for content outside the major studio
production system, they were forced to accede to the studios' demands and
receive less favorable contracts as a result.
Second, the studios were engaged in "block booking." In the words of
one
the Supreme Court, "Block-booking is the practice of licensing ..

19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 11.
22. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
23. Ricard Gil, An Empirical Investigation of the Paramount Antitrust Case 6
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
24. Id. at 8.

25. Id. at 7.
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feature or group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license
another feature or group of features released by the distributors during a
given period. The films are licensed in blocks before they are actually
produced."26 For instance, Gone With the Wind was attached to a handful of
other, less lucrative movies, and independent exhibitors had to choose
between showing all of them or none of them; they could 27
not simply
choose to show Gone With the Wind and pass on the other films.
The Paramount case, which lasted from 1938 to 1948, was not the
first time the studio system had run into antitrust issues. In fact, in 1921,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began pursuing the major studios for r
their vertical integration and use of block booking. 28 In 1928, the DOJ filed
an antitrust suit against the studios and successfully attacked their vertical
integration and block booking. 29 The victory was hollow, though, as the
Great Depression and the National Industry Recovery Act forestalled
enforcement of the sentence against the studios. 30 In 1938, the DOJ again
brought suit against the studios, but this time settled on the condition that
the studios phase out their block booking practices by mid-1942. 3 The
studios failed to meet the 1942 deadline, but World War II caused the DOJ
to delay reopening its action against the studios.32 The DOJ finally
prevailed in 1948 when the Supreme Court handed down its verdict in the
Paramount case.3 3 The Court held that block booking was an unfair
practice and recommended divestiture of the studios' theaters, and
remanded for findings on the issue of divestiture.34
Facing the prospect of continued litigation on remand, the DOJ
offered an olive branch to the studios. If each of the studios would sign a
consent decree forcing divestiture of theaters, the studios could forgo the
millions of dollars in legal fees that surely lay ahead.35 As an indication of
just how much money was at stake, the studios did not view this as an
attractive offer and dug in for another protracted battle. But RKO studios
and its president, the mercurial Howard Hughes, saw the consent decree as
an opportunity to shift the balance of power among the five major studios.36
26. ParamountPictures,334 U.S. at 156.
27. Peter Newcomb & Liz Conte, You Want Michael Jordan? You Gotta Take Boomer
Esiason,FORBES, Nov. 23, 1992, at 96.
28. Gil, supra note 23, at 6.
29. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
30. Gil, supranote 23, at 7.
31. Id.at 7-8.
32. Id.at 8.
33. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
34. Gil, supranote 23, at 9.

35. Id.
36. Id.
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As the weakest of the majors, RKO and Hughes believed that divestiture
would be a much bigger loss for the other studios, and thus RKO could
gain ground by signing the consent decree and pressuring the other studios
to do the same.37 While it is unclear what effects this move had on RKO
and its market share, Hughes was successful at pressuring the other studios
to follow suit in getting out of the exhibition game.3" This brought on a
massive shift in the way movies were made.
2.

Television

Most studios initially treated the television business as competition.
They attempted to shut television out in its infancy by refusing to license
movies for network broadcast and by closing their studio doors to
television producers. 39 Television was able to thrive in spite of this freezeout. By bringing sports, news, game shows, and independent films directly
into the homes of viewers, television was able to cut into the movie
industry's entertainment market share.4 °
Some simple statistics demonstrate just how sharp the falloff in the
box office has been. In 1947, before the advent of television and at the
height of the movie-going era, the U.S. population was 144 million,4 1 and
4.7 billion movie tickets were sold.42 This constitutes a whopping 32.6
tickets sold per person per year. In 2003, the U.S. population was 290
million,4 3 and 1.57 billion tickets were sold,44 or a paltry 5.4 tickets per
person per year. The "massive moviegoing audience that had nurtured the
studio system.., no longer exist[ed]. ' 45 In any given week of 2003, less
than twelve percent of the opulation bought a movie ticket.
1947
4.7 billion
144 million
32.6
5.4
2003
1.57 billion
290 million
Furthermore, the cost of making movies has shot up astronomically.
In 2003, the studios spent $18 billion to produce, advertise, and distribute
37. Id.
38. Id.at 9-10.
39. EPSTEIN, supranote 13, at 12.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES (2000),
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt.
42. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17.
43. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, TABLE 1: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO Rico: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2007 (2007),

http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2007-0 1.xls.
44. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17.
45. Id.
46. Id.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61

films under their own imprint or their subsidiaries' "independent"
imprints. 47 However, these same films only recovered $6.4 billion from the
worldwide box office. a
C.

The New System
Why is Hollywood pumping more money into emptier theaters? This
does not seem to be a smart business plan. The answer to this question lies
in windows of exhibition that many in the entertainment industry call
"revenue streams." 49 While the theatrical box office represented one
hundred percent of the studios' revenue in 1948, it is only the tip of the
iceberg now.50 Studios now make the bulk of their profits from licensing
their filmed entertainment for home viewing. 5' These new revenue streams
are designed to capitalize on different consumer lifestyles and the varying
amounts of money consumers are willing to pay. Some consumers prefer
the social experience of going out to the movies, while others prefer to save
money and stay at home; the industry has a broad spectrum of price points
for a broad spectrum of consumers.52
As technology has advanced, more streams of revenue have been
created. Even as late as 1980, studios were still dependent on theatrical
release for the vast majority of their revenue. 3 Then came the video player.
In the 1970s, Betamax players found their way into homes across the
country. While the movie studios originally resisted this technology,5 4 they
eventually came to see an opportunity to create new markets for their
intellectual properties: namely, selling movies on video for home viewing.
With the advent of VHS, DVD, and now Blu-Ray, 5 the home video
market has easily become the biggest profit-producing stream of revenue
for the studios.56 Following home video release, films are then released for
the different forms of television viewing (pay-per-view, pay television,
network, pay television again, basic cable, and finally, syndication). With
each new technology development, the market adjusts the sequence and

47. Id.at 19.

48. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
(1984).
55.

E. SQUIRE, THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 3 (3d ed. 2004).
Epstein, supra note 13, at 20
Id.at 19.
SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 333.
EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 19.
See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
JASON

Matt Richtel & Eric Taub, Taps for HD DVD as Wal-Mart Backs Blu-Ray, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at 1.
56. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 19.
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duration of the various revenue stream windows. For a current example of a
typical movie, see the following chart.
57
Typical Revenue Waterfall
6 mo.
Theatrical
Initial theatrical release (ITR)
10 yr.
4-6 mo. After ITR
Home video
2 mo.
8 mo. After ITR
Pay-per-view
18 mo.
1 yr. After ITR
Pay television (1st)
30
mo.
2.5 yr. After ITR
Network
n
12 mo.
5 yr. After ITR
Pay television ( 2f d)
60 mo.
6 yr. After ITR
Basic Cable
60 mo.
11 yr. After ITR
Syndication
As the above chart demonstrates, the most successful movies can
become franchises that provide steady streams of revenue even ten to
fifteen years after the initial theatrical release. These streams can be
substantial. This is why studios are willing to run an $11 billion yearly
deficit between production and distribution costs and box office revenues.
Home video, pay television, and free television bring in billions of dollars
in additional revenue, completely eliminating the deficit and allowing the
studios to make a tidy profit. In the chart below, note the growth of the
various revenue streams over the past fifty-five years.

Maor Studio Worldwide Revenues
in Billions of 2003 Dollarii
100
6.9
0
0
0
6.9
1948
53
8.2
3.26
.38
.2
4.4
1980
25
11.9
5.59
1.041
2.34
2.96
1985
25
19.8
7.41
1.62
5.87
4.9
1990
21
26.43
7.92
2.34
10.6
5.57
1995
19
31.4
10.75
3.12
11.67
5.87
2000
18
41.1
11.4
3.36
18.9
7.48
2003
to
is
fundamental
above
charts
in
the
The information contained
in
the
integration
vertical
understanding the advantages found in
entertainment industry. Since television and now other forms of home
entertainment (e.g., video games and computers) have cut into theater
attendance, studios realized that they needed to look beyond the box office
for revenue. A few business leaders recognized that movie studios' biggest
problems could be their biggest opportunity. By merging with other forms
of media, studios could recapture, and even surpass, their losses from a
slowdown at the box office.
57. SQuIRE, supra note 49, at 335.
58. EPsTEIN, supra note 13, at 20.
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1.

Disney
Walt Disney may have been the first to realize that the value of films
was not in the box office, but in the licensable properties the films create.
He welcomed television with open arms, quickly creating the Mickey
Mouse Club and other television programming designed to get Disney
properties directly into the homes of families. 59 He partnered with ABC
early on and this created a synergy for both companies. People tuned in to
ABC to see their favorite film characters on television, and Disney in turn
benefited from increased visibility, which helped at the box office and at
the toy store.6° In the time period since Walt Disney died, his company has
grown into a huge conglomerate, snatching up other
movie studios and
6
adding the ABC television network in the process. '
2.

Time Warner
Disney was not the only person to see the value in media synergies.
Steve Ross, head of Warner Bros. Studios, was probably the first to
envision a full-service media conglomerate. He "wanted to own the means
to deliver entertainment to people's homes. 62 Accordingly, Ross began
purchasing cable networks. He thought that the high bandwidth (and thus
high channel capacity) of cable would allow the audience to be segregated
based on interest (e.g., ESPN, HGTV, etc.). 63 This laser-like ability to reach
consumers is highly desirable from an advertising perspective and provides
a more affordable alternative to the shotgun approach of broadcast network
advertising. Part of Ross's plan was to begin showing Warner Bros. movies
on these networks. 64 As he began building the Warner Bros. conglomerate,
he engineered mergers first with Time,65 and then with Turner
Broadcasting System, 66 and then with AOL, 67 giving the new conglomerate
a presence in every form of media.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.at 33.
Id.
Id.at 35.
Id. at 44.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Floyd Norris, Time Inc. and Warner to Merge, Creating Largest Media Company,
N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1989, at Al.
66. Mark Landler, Turner to Merge Into Time Warner; a $7.5 BillionDeal,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1995, at Al.
67. Alex Kuczynski and Bill Carter, Media Megadeal: The Empire; Potentially Big
Effect Seen on Varied Units ofAOL Time Warner,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at C11.
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Sony

While Ross began in the movie business and moved outward to cable,
magazines, and the Internet, Akio Morita had a different path. He began
making simple appliances in the basement of a bombed-out building in
Tokyo in 1945, but quickly expanded his business into consumer
electronics. 68 As co-developer of Betamax and DVD technologies, Morita
understood that the content creator was the one who stood the most to gain
from these new formats. 69 He purchased Columbia Studios and expanded
the motion picture business into Sony Pictures Entertainment.7 ° Sony has
also expanded into television production, another valuable way to create
content for home video and other revenue streams.
4.

NBC Universal

General Electric, owner of NBC, became convinced that the network
would find itself at an increasing disadvantage in acquiring content if it
failed to partner with a major studio, especially in light of all the other
major networks' affiliations with studios.7' In 2003, General Electric
purchased Universal Studios from the French company Vivendi and created
NBC Universal, which is comprised of fourteen local television stations,
six cable networks (USA, Trio, Bravo, the Sci-Fi Network, CNBC, and
MSNBC), Telemundo (one of the largest Spanish-language channels in the
United States), theme parks, and theater chains in Europe and Japan.72
5.

Viacom

Sumner Redstone was an attorney who left practice to work for his
father's theater chain, which he promptly renamed National Amusements.73
In the late 1960s, Redstone decided that there was not a future in theaters,
and looked to invest in movie studios.74 He acquired Viacom, and then
through Viacom, acquired Paramount Studios.75 Since Viacom was
producing about twenty-eight hours a week in television programming,
Redstone thought that purchasing a television network would be the next
logical step.76 Accordingly, for $34 billion in Viacom stock, Redstone
68.

EPSTEIN,

supra note 13, at 48.

69. Id. at 54.
70. Geraldine Fabrikant, Sale to Sony Approved by Columbia Pictures, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1989, at D9.
71. EPSTEIN, supranote 13, at 79.
72. Joseph Adalian, NBC Says: I Believe in U, WEEKLY VARIETY, Sept. 14, 2003, at 1.

73.

EPSTEIN,

supra note 13, at 67.

74. Id. at 68.
75. Geraldine Fabrikant, Viacom to Announce Deal to Acquire Paramount,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1993, at A37.
76. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 73.
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purchased CBS Corporation, which included the CBS and UPN television
networks, twelve broadcast stations in major markets, a massive group of
radio stations, the largest billboard company in the world, and five cable
networks." In a 1997 interview, Redstone revealed his business strategy:
"Whether entertainment is delivered by satellite or a slow boat to China,
it's what's on it that's going to count. Content is king, and producing it
takes a lot of creativity and innovation.' '7 8 While content takes creativity,
Redstone still believes content is only a means to an end; that is, attracting
viewers. Viewers themselves are only a means to the ultimate endadvertising dollars. 79 With his conglomerate, Redstone was finally able to
achieve that end.
6.

News Corporation

Rupert Murdoch has a similar story to Redstone's. Murdoch's
wealthy father owned several newspapers throughout Australia when he
died, but left Murdoch only one. 80 From that small beginning, Murdoch
built a national newspaper, and then expanded to newspapers in London
and the United States.81 His News Corporation did not stop with
newspapers; Murdoch's next goal was to build a home-entertainment
empire that would span the world through geosynchronous satellite
networks. He bought what eventually became Sky TV, a European satellite
subscription service, to begin this network. 2 However, he quickly realized
that it would be hard to convince the market to pay for a service it could
easily receive for free through broadcast television. 3 He determined that
owning a movie studio would be the best way to get content to boost
subscriptions. Murdoch set his sights on Warner Bros. 4
However, Steve Ross, Warner Bros.' head, bought several broadcast
television stations owned by the Chris-Craft Corporation in an
extraordinarily shrewd move. 5 Since Murdoch was an Australian citizen,
and Warner Bros. now controlled a company with several broadcast
licenses, Murdoch was effectively blocked from purchasing the Warner
Bros. conglomerate. If Murdoch had gone through with the purchase, his
77. Lawrie Mifflin, Making a Media Giant: The Overview; Viacom to Buy CBS,
Forming2d Largest Media Company, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at Al.
78. John Koch, Sumner Redstone; The Interview, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 1997, at 12.
79. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 74.
80. Id.at 59.
81. Id.at 59-60.
82. Id.at 61.
83. Id.at 62.
84. Murdoch Raises New F.C.C.Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1984, at D4.
85. Sandra Salmans, Chris-Craft, Warner in Stock Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1983, at
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ownership and control of the broadcast television stations would have been
in violation of the foreign ownership restrictions of § 310 of the
Communications Act of 1934, and would have risked forfeiture of the
licenses.86 Ross had thwarted his plans, but not for long.
In 1985, Murdoch bought half the stock in the troubled Fox Studios,
and in 1987, he bought the remainder. 7 Realizing that a broadcast network
was absolutely necessary to his business plan, Murdoch decided to become
a naturalized citizen of the United States.88 Many feel that the Reagan
administration gave Murdoch "inordinately preferential treatment" in
expediting the naturalization process. 89 Regardless, Murdoch had finally
removed his Achilles' heel. As a naturalized citizen, there was no longer a
bar to his owning and controlling broadcast networks.
This newfound citizenship opened the door for Murdoch to purchase
Metromedia, a small network of ten broadcast stations in New York, Los
Angeles, and five other large markets, for $2 billion.90 Murdoch then turned
the stations into Fox, the first new network since the 1930s. 9' The network
could reach twenty-two percent of the American population with its
original ten stations,92 and quickly grew as other stations affiliated with
Fox.
7.

Summary
As it now stands, six major media conglomerates own all the major
movie studios and broadcast networks in America, sixty-four cable
networks, and a whole host of other ventures in newspapers, magazines, the
Internet, and the music business.93 Furthermore, these conglomerates have
shown a penchant for acquiring successful independent studios. Disney's
$60 million acquisition of Miramax in 199394 and Viacom's 2006 purchase
of DreamWorks for $1.6 billion 95 are two examples.

86. 47 U.S.C. §310 (2000).
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 63.
88. Id.
89. David Gunzerath, Rupert K. Murdoch, MUSEUM OF BRDCST. COMM.,
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/M/htmlM/murdochrupe/murdochrupe.htm
(last visited
Jan. 31, 2009). See also William Safire, Editorial, The MultinationalMan, Cm. TRiB., May
17, 1985, at C27.
90. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 63.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 82.
94. Robert Marich, et al., Miramax Goes to Disney World; Weinsteins Will Stay on in
Deal Peggedat $60 Mil, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., May 3, 1993, at 1.
95. Jill Goldsmith, Wall Street Backs DreamWorks Deal, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 13,
2005, at 1.
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Mergers and acquisitions are perpetual in the entertainment industry.
Keeping track of all the transactions between parent companies and
subsidiaries can be difficult, but below is a table that provides a basic
outline of the industry as it currently stands. While this is by no means
exhaustive, it does show how the architects of this new system have
strategically acquired companies in the various forms of media to build
powerful conglomerates.
Thp Rio Ciy CnnPlnmerntee

Sony
Pictures,
Columbia

United
Artists, MGM

Universal

Focus

TV
Production,
Sony
Electronics,
Bertelsmann
Music
NBC

UiWtst"SalFeatures,
DreamWorks

Te

Wamer

Warner
Bros.

Picturehouse,
New Line
Cinema

The CW

USA,

Universal

MSNBC,

Music

CNBC,
Bravo, Trio,
Sci-Fi

(Vivendi), TV
Production

HBO, CNN,
TBS, TCM,
TNN, TNT

Warner
Music, TIME
Magazine, TV
Production

W'at Disncy

ws

Co

VIACoim

Disney,

Miramax,

Touchstone

Hollywood
Pictures,
Pixar

20iht Century
Fox

Searchlight,
Fox Faith

Paramount

Vantage

ABC

The D:sney

The Disney

Channel,
ABC Family

Store, TV
Production,
Radio Disney

FOX

FX, Fox
News, Fox
Family

TV
Production

CBS, The

Nickelodeon,

CBS Radio,

CW

MTV, VH1

CBS Outdoor,

King World,
TV
Distribution

This vertical integration creates several synergies for the
conglomerates. Commercials on television can be used to promote movies,
and movies can then return the favor by delivering home audiences to
advertisers when the movie reaches the free television exhibition window.
In this new world where the networks and studios are merged, networks
tend to buy most or all of their programming from the studio. 96 Thus, a
corporation like Time Warner can release a Warner Bros. movie in the
96. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 79.
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theaters, then release it on DVD and through pay-per-view, and finally
cycle it through their pay-television networks, such as HBO, and their
broadcast network, The CW. Meanwhile, the soundtrack for the movie can
be released on the Warner Music Group label. Instead of having to make
arms-length transactions for all of these licenses and release revenue to
other companies, Time Warner is able to handle almost all forms of content
delivery in-house and keep the revenues in-house as well. This can save
companies millions of dollars as they undertake the transactions necessary
to license and exhibit.
While Rupert Murdoch's difficulties in purchasing a movie studio and
then television network are documented above, the next Part will flesh out
the unique challenges § 310 presents to the entertainment industry as it
takes on an increasingly international flair.
III. RULES GOVERNING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
Congress first addressed its concerns about foreign ownership of
media outlets in the Radio Act of 1912. The Act as a whole was passed
because radio stations were overpowering each other by interfering with
each others' signals in the unregulated environment.98 The foreign
ownership restriction was added at the urging of the United States Navy,
which was concerned with the national security risks of interference with
coastal radio stations. 99 In the Radio Act of 1927,1°° Congress again
included a foreign ownership restriction. The intent this time appears to
have been to prevent the kind of foreign espionage that occurred in the
opening days of World War I, when two German radio stations
communicated with German naval vessels off the coast of the United
States." °" These restrictions stood until American communications law was
fundamentally reorganized in the mid-1930s.
A.

The CommunicationsAct
Under the Communications Act of 1934, Congress reorganized the
country's communications
laws and established the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). The 1934 Act incorporated many
existing rules, including the foreign ownership restrictions of the 1912 and

97. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat. 302, 302 (1912) (regulating radio
communication).
98. Erwin Krasnow, Member of Verner, Lupfert, Bernard, McPherson & Hand,
Washington, D.C., Address at the Foreign Ownership in the Communications IndustriesAn Analysis of Section 310 Symposium, in MEDIA L. & POL'Y 10, 14 (1995).
99. Id.
100. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
101. Krasnow, supra note 98, at 10.
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1927 Acts.' 0 2 They were codified in the 1934 Act under § 310(b), which
read in its original form:
No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or
aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held by(1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign
government;
(3) any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien or of
which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or
voted by aliens or their representatives or by a foreign government or
representative thereof or by any corporation organized under the laws
of a foreign country;
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the
directors are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital
stock is owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by
a foreign government or representative thereof, or by any corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the [FCC] finds that
the public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such
license. 103
Section 310(b) stood untouched for over sixty years, despite many
changes in the communications business. Congress finally made sweeping
changes in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act). ° 4 It is most
notable for beginning the deregulation movement in telecommunications,
but it also addressed foreign ownership restrictions.
The 1996 Act amended the 1934 Act by eliminating the foreign
officer or director restrictions under § 310(b)(3). Congress rigorously
debated a proposed "reciprocity rule" that would render § 310(b) wholly
inapplicable when the applicant is owned or controlled by a company from
a country that would (or is soon likely to) grant similar licenses to an
American-owned company. Under a reciprocity regime, one foreign-owned
company might be granted a carrier license, but another foreign-owned
company might not, because the former country is in the practice of
granting licenses to American companies and the latter country is not. In
the end, Congress did not include any reciprocity rule. 10 5
However, perhaps as a response to the change in rhetoric coming from
Capitol Hill, the FCC announced that it would grant licenses to foreign
carriers from countries with open markets, subject to a new rule called the
102. Vincent M. Paladini, Note, Foreign Ownership Restrictions Under Section 310(b)
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 350-51 (1996).
103. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title III, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081
(codified as amended 47 U.S.C. § 310 (2006)).
104. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
105. Paladini, supra note 102, at 357.

Number 2]

ALIEN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTION

"Effective Competitive Opportunities test," or ECO test for short. 106 The
test looks at four things in determining whether the foreign market is open:
whether there are legal barriers to entry by foreigners, whether the
interconnection is permitted under nondiscriminatory conditions, whether
competitive safeguards exist, and whether a regulatory agency exists to
protect the foreigner. 0 7 The FCC established the ECO test to promote
effective competition in U.S. telecommunications services markets, to
prevent anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets, and to encourage
foreign markets to open up to U.S. companies.' 0 8 At this time, the ECO test
does not apply to broadcasters, though; only common carriers. 109
B.

Impact in the EntertainmentIndustry
We have already seen how Steve Ross at Warner Bros. used the
foreign ownership restriction to block Rupert Murdoch from buying the
studio."10 By purchasing the Chris-Craft stations, Ross brought § 31 0(b)(4)
into play. It ensured that Warner Bros. would have to be owned by an
American citizen as long as it owned the broadcast stations.
As described above, Murdoch did eventually end up getting his
broadcast network with the Metromedia purchase. However, his troubles
with § 310(b) were only beginning. Soon after acquiring the twelve
Metromedia stations, Murdoch pursued the purchase of another twelve
stations as part of a joint venture. Unlike the first twelve, these stations
were affiliated with ABC, CBS, or NBC prior to their purchase."'
Murdoch also tweaked the big three networks by outbidding them for rights
to broadcast NFL games. Fox's gains were beginning to draw attention
from its competitors.
The NAACP"1 2 and NBC 1 3 filed petitions contesting Fox's ownership
of broadcast licenses. Both petitions questioned whether Fox-as a
subsidiary of Sydney's News Corporation-had violated the foreign
ownership restrictions of § 310(b). Ultimately, the FCC decided that the
structure of News Corporation and Fox did exceed the twenty-five percent
rule found in § 31 0(b)(4). 14 However, the FCC agreed to waive the rule if
Fox could demonstrate that such a waiver was in the public interest, as the
106.
95-137,
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

FCC Adopts New Rules on Foreign Carrier Entry Into U.S. Markets, Rep. No. DC
IB Docket No. 95-22 (Nov. 1995).
Paladini, supra note 102, at 362.
Id.
Id. at 363.
EPSTEIN,

supranote 13, at 62.

Benz, supra note 6, at 241-42.
Id. at243.
Id. at244.
Id. at263.
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statute allowed." 5 After making the requisite showing of public interest,
Fox was indeed granted the waiver. 16
NBC's position in the challenge is even more interesting. In a
November 1995 symposium, NBC Executive Vice President and General
Counsel Richard Cotton spoke about the network's challenge to Fox. He
claimed that NBC filed the petition out of fairness considerations; that
NBC wanted to be on a "level playing field" with Fox. 1 7 Cotton
maintained that NBC was seeking a declaration as to which of the
interpretations was correct so that NBC could plan its future business
accordingly. NBC had previously been in discussions "to finance and
purchase stations with Sony, Matsushita, and other international firms," but
these talks were abandoned after NBC concluded that the FCC would not
allow such a joint venture." 8 Fox's success with the FCC has given the
industry some hope that it may pursue joint broadcasting ventures with
foreign partners.
At this symposium, Cotton explained that NBC struggled in the late
1980s with its investments in foreign markets because the foreign
governments were imposing parallel ownership restrictions on NBC. In
most of the partnerships, NBC was limited to a fifteen or twenty percent
stake. Almost none of the partnerships succeeded because "the foreign
partner did not possess the skills necessary to successfully manage the
broadcast station.' '" 9 In effect, these foreign governments had enacted
reciprocal ownership restraints against U.S. companies, forcing NBC to
watch helplessly as its foreign partners squandered its investment.
Cotton's statements more or less ring true with what other industry
insiders said at the time. Many felt that in protesting Fox's license, NBC
had put itself into a "win-win situation.' 20 If NBC prevailed, Fox would
lose time, money, and momentum in efforts to bring itself into compliance
with § 310(b)(4). However, if NBC were to lose its petition, the U.S.
market would become more open for foreign investors, 121 just as Richard
Cotton had suggested. Furthermore, General Electric was toying with the
idea of selling NBC at the time, 22 so a decision in Fox's favor could open
the market up to a large bidding war for NBC
between such foreign
123
investors as Sony, Matsushita, and Bertelsmann.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at264.
Krasnow, supranote 98, at 13.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Benz, supra note 6, at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Instead of selling NBC, General Electric did quite the opposite. After
determining that the network could not be sold to a foreign investor,
General Electric negotiated to purchase Vivendi Universal in 2003. This
deal was also affected by § 310(b). While companies were rushing to
conglomerate, Vivendi Universal was shut out because (as a French
company) it could never own an American broadcast network. Instead,
Vivendi sold eighty percent of its stake in Universal Studios and twenty
percent of its stake in Universal Music Group. 124 This gave Vivendi a
twenty percent stake in the newly formed NBC Universal, which was well
within the limit imposed by § 310(b). In exchange for this limited stake,
Vivendi got to keep the eighty percent stake in Universal Music Group,
which is now based out of France. 125 The General Electric-Vivendi
business relationship seems to be working well, but it is likely that the
merger could have been better structured had the foreign ownership
restrictions not been in place. As an interesting side note, consider the
amount of savings estimated by the synergy of joining this movie studio
and this broadcast network with all their associated parts. At least one
26
analyst found NBC Universal's estimate of $400 million to be plausible.
However, Time Warner's 1990 merger resulted in less revenue from
synergies than the NBC Universal
estimate, but company executives were
27
still pleased with the outcome.1
This Part includes just two examples of how the foreign ownership
restrictions have impacted the entertainment business. One could look to
Sony and Matsushita's continual inability to acquire a U.S. broadcast
television network for more examples. Sony has made the best of the
situation by producing programming to air on the other studios' networks,
but is still locked out of the synergies that corporations like Viacom and
NBC Universal are able to harvest by producing and exhibiting their own
content.
Studios are not the only party limited by the restriction; networks are
hurt, too. When the pool of potential buyers is small, the final sale price is
likely to be lower than if the pool of potential buyers is larger. If General
Electric had opted to sell NBC in the mid 1990s, imagine how much higher
the sale price could have been in an auction where Sony, Bertelsmann,
Matsushita, and Vivendi were all allowed to bid.

124. Bill Carter, G.E. Finishes Vivendi Deal, Expanding Its Media Assets, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2003, at CI.
125. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 81.

126. See Carter, supra note 124.
127. Randall Rothenberg, Time Warner's Merger Payoff, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at
A29.
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C. Attempts at Circumvention
The FCC has, at times, relaxed the alien ownership restrictions under
§ 310(b)(4), especially where the aliens are citizens of nations with close
and friendly ties with the United States, and the aliens
would not exercise
28
direct control over the subsidiaries that hold licenses.'
Furthermore, Congress provided the FCC with a way out from the
statute's restrictiveness by looking to the public interest. The FCC has
generally declined to go this route, but it has outlined four factors that
might lead it to ignore § 3 10(b)(4):
(1) [W]hether the alien's country of citizenship enjoys close and
friendly relations with the United States; (2) the extent of foreign
ownership or control of the corporation (i.e., whether the alien(s)
hold(s) a majority or minority share); (3) whether the licensed facility
involved is passive in nature (i.e., where the licensee exercises no
control over the content of the transmission, such
as a common
129
carrier); and (4) the qualifications of the applicant.
In addition to the above, one group of scholars has suggested that the
FCC might consider the following factors: whether the aliens exercise
control over or supervise operations at the licensee subsidiary, whether the
foreign investment raises the traditional issues of concern that foreign
investment brings, whether foreign participation will help ensure the
continued vitality of a business, whether the transfer is temporary, whether
the transfer is necessary to save a failing company or to nurture an infant
industry, whether a transfer will protect against deterioration in
programming, and whether the alien's home
country allows investment by
30
American citizens in similar investments.
There are only two instances of the twenty-five percent restriction
being waived by the FCC for broadcast licenses. The first broadcast waiver
occurred in 1966, but the FCC severely limited the ability of the French
bank to control the operations of its subsidiary licensee in that case. 3 ' The
second instance occurred with News32Corporation and the Fox Network in
1995, as discussed in the Part above.
In an important ruling, the FCC has interpreted §§ 310(b)(3) and
310(b)(4) as noncumulative, so a foreign national may own both twenty
percent of the company with the broadcast license and twenty-five
percent
33
of that company's parent company without violating the statute.'
128. Ronald W. Gavillet, et al., Structuring Foreign Investments in FCC Licensees
Under Section 310(b) of the Communications Act, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 7, 16 (1991).
129. Id. at 17 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (2000)).
130. Id. at 17-18.
131. Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, 6 F.C.C.2d 418 (1966).
132. Benz, supra note 6, at 264.
133. Data Transmission Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 439,440 (1975).
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These rulings may be helpful for a company like Vivendi that is only
interested in making money off its investment, but what about the Rupert
Murdochs of the world? When a foreign national wants to be able to
control a licensee company or a parent of a licensee company, what
alternatives does he or she have? Is there an alternative short of
naturalization? More than a few authors have suggested that this statute
should be repealed; it is a relic of a different era.134 Is pushing for full-scale
repeal of § 310(b) the best course of action for media and entertainment
businesses?
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A.

Eliminating the Rule

Outright repeal of the statute by Congress would be the cleanest
solution--Congress can give, and Congress can take away. However, this
is unlikely to occur for political reasons. Even if the idea were to gain
traction, some American-owned broadcast stations would raise the specter
of national security risks, and the media uproar would likely kill the repeal
bill. A similar situation occurred in 2006 when President Bush began
to run many American ports.
negotiating to hire a Dubai-based company
135
The ensuing media storm killed the deal.
Another unlikely strategy would be for a business to file suit in an
attempt to have the Supreme Court strike down § 310(b) as an
unconstitutional restriction on speech. The Constitution does not
discriminate between citizens and resident aliens in its Bill of Rights
guarantees, and some scholars argue that § 310(b) denies resident aliens
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 136 While this argument has
some merit, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find it convincing.
Freedom of speech and the press is almost always balanced against the
government interest at stake, 37 and this seems to be one of the situations
where government interests outweigh individual interests. There are other
ways for resident aliens to interject their speech; broadcast license
ownership does not place a very substantial limitation upon them. It would
be hard to imagine the Court striking down § 310(b). Rather, the Court
134. See generally Rose, supra note 3.
135. Deborah Orin and Bill Sanderson, 'Dubai Dubya' in Dock Shock - Threatens 1st
Veto on Bill to Nix Port Takeover, N.Y. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at 7, availableat 2006 WLNR
6488571.
136. Rose, supra note 3, at 1183.
137. When the courts apply strict scrutiny, a "compelling state interest" can overcome a
restriction on speech. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
When the courts apply intermediate scrutiny, an "important or substantial government
interest" can overcome a restriction on speech. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 37677 (1968).
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would likely defer to Congress, and if it took any negative action, it might
be a minor carving-out of the applicability of the statute to resident aliens,
as opposed to a full-scale striking down of the statute.
From its inception, opponents of this statute have argued that foreign
ownership restrictions are unnecessary because of the President's War
Powers. 3 8 Any perceived national security threat could be quickly
overcome by suspension of the license. Furthermore, the President has
other powers, such as the use of executive orders, to restrain the dangers of
foreign-owned broadcasting in dangerous times. While such a suspension
would be highly irregular, it is an option for protection when absolutely
necessary.
B.

RestructuringCorporations

The most practical response appears to be the restructuring of
corporations in order to meet the requirements of §§ 310(b)(3)-(4). But
even after owning twenty percent of the licensee company and twenty-five
percent of its parent company, a foreign owner may not find itself in a
sufficiently strong position to run the companies. Particularly salient are
Richard Cotton's comments above about watching another company
squander NBC's investment.
Conglomerates would do well to avoid crossing the line between
creative structuring and clearly violating the rules. The FCC has interpreted
"control" in the Act to mean "every form of control, actual or legal, direct
or indirect, negative or affirmative. 1 39 The FCC looks to more40 than just
control over finances when determining control of a corporation.
While this may be the most practical response to the foreign
ownership restriction, it is far from ideal from a business perspective.
Millions of dollars are left on the table without the synergies created by full
ownership of a broadcast network.
C.

Divestiture of Companies Owning BroadcastLicenses

The best, and still far from perfect, solution to this problem for a
foreign-owned or -controlled company is to divest itself of its companies
that own broadcast licenses. From this position, the conglomerate may
pursue two possibly overlapping courses of action.
First, the parent company could use its movie production facilities to
produce television shows, thus functioning as a content supplier by selling
programming to other networks. Warner Bros. Studios has a strong

138. 68 Cong. Rec. 3037 (1927).
139. WVIZ, Inc., 36 F.C.C. 561, 579 (1964) (internal citations omitted).
140. Watkins, supra note 5, at 15.
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tradition of doing just this; its broadcast network (The CW, owned in
partnership with Viacom/Paramount) is a relatively minor source of
revenue, but Warner Bros. also supplies television programs to the big four
networks. 141 This allows the foreign investor with a strong interest in
providing content an opportunity to do so.
Second, the parent company could invest heavily in creating a strong
non-broadcast network. 42 This is a tremendous opportunity afforded by the
FCC's refusal to restrict alien ownership of cable and satellite systems on
grounds that they pose no threat to national security. 143 While other
networks had to rely on broadcast licenses to get their content into homes
as they grew, a startup network could grow through cable and satellite.
NBC applied this strategy to great success throughout the 1990s in foreign
markets, mainly because it allowed NBC to hold majority stakes in
relatively less-regulated cable and satellite networks. 144
According to a 2003 study, eighty-six percent of Americans get their
television through cable or satellite services. 45 The greatest opportunity for
content generation and distribution to exist side-by-side in a single, foreignowned company is through creating a superstation.
Currently, WGN is the only American superstation. 46 WGN and TBS
pioneered the superstation concept some time ago, but TBS transitioned to
an ad-supported cable network in the late 1990S.147 The WGN superstation
is run by WGN-TV, a traditional broadcast station based out of Chicago.
The superstation shows about a hundred Major League Baseball games a
year (divided between the Chicago Cubs and the Chicago White Sox), a
dozen Chicago Bulls basketball games, and numerous first-run syndicated

141. The following is a sampling of Warner-produced television programs: The F.B.L,
The Dukes of Hazzard, Full House, Murphy Brown, The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, Friends,
M4Dtv, The West Wing, and Two and a Half Men. See Television by Title,
http://www.wamerbros.com/#/page--television (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
142. Broadcast is but one form of multi-channel video program distributor (MVPD).
Cable and satellite are the two main alternative MVPDs. Annual Assurement of Status of
Competition in Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17
F.C.C.R. 1244, 1246-47 (2002).
143. Watkins, supra note 5, at 12.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Frank James, FCC Chief Warns of Future Shock; Michael Powell Envisions
Calamity for Broadcast TV and Telephone Service Unless the Country Changes What He
Regards as Outdated Regulations, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2003, at Cl, available at 2003
WLNR 15410860.
146. John Dempsey, Trib's Troubles Don't Trip Up Superstation, WEEKLY VARIETY,
Jan. 21, 2007, at 18.
147. Id.
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shows. 148 The network reached seventy million homes in 2006, 49and that
number marks a significant growth over the previous half-decade.1
A media conglomerate looking to build a presence in television could
construct a network very similar to WGN. The affiliated movie studio
could supply a steady stream of films for the fledgling network. Also, any
news resources of the conglomerate (such as newspapers, online resources,
and cable news networks) could be incorporated into the new network.
Finally, the conglomerate could make a substantial investment in creating
original, scripted programming that competes with the major broadcast
networks in terms of quality. As the network grows in popularity, it could
expand to include sports and local news if the conglomerate determines that
doing so would be profitable.
Indeed, this is not a unique idea---other networks (both broadcast and
non-broadcast) have developed this same blueprint for success. Little
known broadcast network Ion TV (formerly PAX) has begun expanding its
offerings in an effort to build viewership. 15 ° The network began by airing
inexpensive syndicated shows, but has recently purchased the rights to air
"ER," "NCIS," and "Boston Legal." Ion TV plans to then expand to game
shows, reality television, and finally, scripted series, as the network
brand-and viewership-grows.151 More established non-broadcast
networks such as USA, FX, and TNT are now able to compete head-tohead with the major broadcast networks for viewers.152 According to
"NYPD Blue" creator Steven Bochco, who is currently producing "Raising
the Bar" for TNT, "[t]he death grip that broadcast had on viewers is broken
....There are a lot of options out there, and people are loyal to the shows
they like. The broadcast
networks can't lay claim to the kind of exclusivity
15 3
to.'
used
they
that
This strategy of divesting ownership of broadcast licenses, creating
content for other broadcast networks, and investing in a non-broadcast
network will require substantial capital investment. Furthermore, building a
network takes time, so the investment will not yield immediate returns.
Despite these drawbacks, this strategy is the most likely path to success for
a foreign-owned conglomerate that wishes to create and distribute content
on television in the United States.

148.
149.
150.
at 12.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
John Dempsey, Little Ion Looks for Off-Net Jolt, WEEKLY

VARIETY, Sept.

Id.
Kimberly Nordyke, Cablers Target Broadcast's Fall Domain, THE

REP., Oct. 9, 2008, at 1.

153. Id.

8, 2008,

HOLLYWOOD
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V. CONCLUSION
There is no easy way around the foreign ownership restriction for a
foreign investor. Indeed, the statute is very effective at achieving its stated
goal. However, in the increasingly international media and entertainment
business, § 310(b) has become a source of new and constant problems.
Media and entertainment companies should use a two-pronged approach in
overcoming the problems caused by this restriction.
First, businesses barred from holding broadcast licenses should invest
heavily in developing a non-broadcast superstation. As fewer people
51 4
receive their television signal from terrestrial broadcast than ever before,'
it might be possible to create a strong enough presence on cable and
satellite to compete with the traditional broadcast networks. While this
option has great potential, it also requires a tremendous amount of initial
investment.
Second, businesses should lobby for gradual changes in the way the
FCC applies § 310(b). While there are strong arguments on both sides of
whether to repeal the entire Section, it is important to recognize the value
of stability. Indeed, it is in these conglomerates' best interests for any
change in § 310 to come slowly, with adequate time for the market to
respond and adapt to the changes made.
The best way to affect such a gradual change in the law is through
business participation in FCC rulemaking and adjudication. If media
companies apply gentle pressure, the FCC may gradually adjust its
interpretation of the public interest exception to the twenty-five percent
restriction found in § 310(b)(4). Slow change will give the FCC time to
evaluate the consequences of its actions before causing maj or disruptions in
the market, and it will also allow Congress to exert oversight in the process.
If the FCC makes a decision that Congress deems ill-advised, then
Congress will have recourse to pass a statute before too many licensees are
affected.
This solution is superior for three reasons. First, it provides more
stability to the entertainment and media businesses as the network
broadcast economy gradually shifts from a national one to an international
one. Second, it relies on an appointed commission (instead of elected
officials) to undertake a potentially politically unpopular move. Third, it
requires very few changes in the substantive law, but rather just a change in
154. At the end of 2007, there were 112 million television households in the United
States. Of those, 64 million (58%) subscribed to cable, and another 32 million (29%)
subscribed to some other multi-channel video program distributor. In sum, 96 million
households (87%) are no longer dependent on broadcast signals for television distribution.
See Nat'l Cable and Telecomms. Ass'n, Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/Statistic/
Statistics.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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the way the existing law is interpreted. This means that the change, if done
through the FCC, is likely to have fewer unintended effects on other
aspects of law and business.
As this Note has argued, a broadcast license is still necessary for a
conglomerate to maximize its synergies. Conglomerates that are currently
blocked from holding a broadcast license should be pursuing non-broadcast
network options and lobbying the FCC for a more lenient application of the
public interest waiver found in § 31 O(b)(4).

